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Abstract
The U.S. Federal Reserve responded to liquidity shortage through compulsory loan
guarantee scheme and bank recapitalisations mainly under Capital Purchase Program
(CPP) for commercial banks. The bailout packages provided under CPP seem to be
efficient in responding to the liquidity crisis subject to large banks that contributed
the most to systemic risk. However, smaller banks that were actually exposed to the
mortgage market and non-performing loans were denied the financial aid or received
CPP funds of a relatively smaller size. Such CPP funds allocation was efficient from the
point of view of taxpayer as the probability of bailout non-repayments was minimised.
However, it did not support real estate loan recapitalisations that could become a
reason of large welfare loses for the homeowners.
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Re´sume´
La Re´serve Fe´de´rale ame´ricaine a re´agi au manque de liquidite´ a` travers la garantie
obligatoire des preˆts et des recapitalisations bancaires principalement dans le cadre
du Capital Purchase Program (CPP) pour les banques commerciales. Les ”bailout pa-
ckages” fournis sous le CPP semblent efficaces pour re´pondre a` la crise de liquidite´
en ce qui concerne les grandes banques qui ont contribue´ le plus au risque syste´mique.
Cependant, les banques de petite taille qui avaient e´te´ effectivement expose´s au marche´
hypothe´caire et aux preˆts non productifs se sont vues refuser l’aide financie`re ou ont
rec¸u des fonds du CPP en quantite´ relativement moins importante, ce qui peut expli-
quer une perte de bien-eˆtre par les proprie´taires immobiliers. Une telle re´partition des
fonds du CPP a e´te´ efficace du point de vue du contribuable parce que la probabilite´
de non-remboursement des fonds de sauvetage a e´te´ re´duite au minimum.
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1 Introduction
Financial crisis of 2007 had a large cost for the economy as a whole. Besides the welfare
loses for financial institutions, private firms and households, government interventions all over
the world have become a heavy burden for the society. Government interventions included
various measures that mostly constituted from loans guarantee schemes on newly issued
senior unsecured debt and bank recapitalisations. The U.S. Treasury offered a substantial
amount of liquidity to banks through purchases of preferred equity stakes under Capital
Purchase Program (further referred to as CPP, for more details see Acharya and Sundaram,
2009 ; Panetta et al., 2009 ; King, 2009 ; Cooley and Philippon, 2009 ; Khatiwada, 2009).
The debate concerning the effectiveness of the U.S. rescue packages offered to commercial
banks still continues. On one hand, the regulators were concerned about ”moral hazard”
problem (Dam and Koetter, 2011 ; Gale and Vives, 2002 ; Stiglitz, 2012), on the other hand,
bank recapitalisations were unavoidable to support solvent but illiquid banks and to stabilise
the financial markets (Fender and Gyntelberg, 2008).
Comparing to other types of government support, purchase of preferred or common shares
is often seen as one of the most efficient types of capital infusion (see Wilson and Wu, 2010).
Another pro-argument of the CPP is that the program did not end up costing much to
taxpayers. It used 204.6 billion dollars of the 250 billion dollars stipulated earlier (more
than a third of the total TARP funding) and approximately half of the commercial banks
repurchased their preferred shares from the Treasury by the year 2012.
In this article the focus is on the determinants of liquidity provisions under CPP. The
goal of the paper is to define, first of all, factors that determined the final bailout allocation
(both the fact of receiving CPP funds and the relative size of CPP funds) and the bailout
repayments1. Based on that, it is possible to assess the effectiveness of CPP according to the
goals of the program and the risks for the taxpayers.
The analysis is motivated by several hypotheses. First hypothesis is that the distribution
1The bailout repayments under CPP mean repurchase of the Treasury’s equity stake
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of CPP funds and its repayment are dependent on financial fragility of the commercial banks
just before the crisis. These variables are similar to those used in the probability of default
models. The regulators are expected to provide liquidity to more financially fragile banks as
well as exposed to so-called ”tail risk” that materialized after a secular collapse in housing
markets banks.
The second hypothesis is that CPP funds were designed to minimise the spillover effect of
the crisis to the economy at large. First, there was a risk of reduction in credit availability due
to deterioration of the financial industry’s intermediary role. Second, there was a significant
counterparty risk, mostly from the side of LCFIs2.
The contribution of the banks to systemic risk is estimated through Marginal Expected
Shortfall (MES) (Acharya et al., 2010), ∆CoV aR (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011), bank
size and beta (last two are individual systemic risk indicators).
The third hypothesis is that political contributions (including lobbying activities) and
locational advantages of the commercial banks may induce generous distribution of CPP
funds towards some banks. Duchin and Sosyura (2012) find the evidence of higher likelihood
of politically connected firms to be funded.
The last hypothesis is that excessive risk-taking of the bank have triggered the need of
the bank for CPP funds in 2008-2009 (Kibritcioglu A., 2002). The more risk the bank was
undertaking prior to crisis of 2007 (proxied by the change in bank’s stock returns), the higher
should have been its loses during the crisis and, thus, the greater its need in CPP funds is
expected to be comparing to other banks.
The article is completing the literature on bailouts and the effectiveness of liquidity provi-
sions. It tends to improve the assessment of bailout programs through additional analysis of
bailout repayments during four years following the disbursement of CPP funds. It is poten-
tially an important source of information concerning the realised risks of funding allocation
that were tried to be avoided by the Federal Reserve when designing the bailout packages.
2Large Complex Financial Institutions
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Various econometric models are applied to analyse the capital injections under CPP and
their reimbursement : logit, OLS, polytomous and duration models.
Results of logit and OLS regressions suggest that the rescue packages in the U.S. were
designed in a way to provide liquidity to more financially distressed and more systemically
important commercial banks. From this point of view, the CPP program can be assessed
as a successful bailout program that helped to recapitalise large financial institutions with
temporal liquidity problems and to avoid the collapse of entire banking system.
According to the results of polytomous and duration models banks that were larger
contributors to systemic risk (measured through MES, beta and bank size) were also the
ones that repaid their loan totally and in the shorter period of time. Thus, from the point
of view of taxpayer the risks of non-repayment and the time until the CPP funds repayment
were minimised.
On the other hand, bailout packages failed to support the banks that were actually
exposed to mortgage and non-performing loans as well as mortgage-backed securities. Banks
with higher share of mortgages in their total loans are found to exhibit a smaller probability
of receiving CPP funds and if approved for the program to receive a smaller size loan. The
same pattern is found for the commercial banks more exposed to MBSs and non-performing
loans.
It could be explained by the fact that regulators classified such banks as insolvent with
higher risk of bailout non-repayment. The banks with larger share of mortgage and non-
performing loans on their balance sheets are associated with higher probability of CPP
funds non-repayment during 2009-2012 and longer duration until repurchase of their stock
from the Treasury.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the estimation methodo-
logy. Section 3 introduces the data, describes dependent and explanatory variables. Empirical
results for cross-section logit, OLS, polytomous and time-to-event regressions analysing the
factors that determined CPP funds disbursement and their repayments are presented in
5
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Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model specifications for studying CPP funds alloca-
tion and their repayments
2.1 Determinants of CPP funds allocation in 2008-2009 : logit and
OLS regressions
Allocation of CPP funds among commercial banks in the U.S. is analysed using logistic
regression and cross-section OLS. The former one focuses on the probability of the CPP funds
disbursement to the particular commercial bank, while the latter one studies the relative size
of the distributed CPP funds.
Logit regression allows to estimate the probability of the dependent variable to be equal
to 1 (probability that some event occurs). Here BDi represents a binary variable that takes
a value of 1 if a particular bank i received CPP funds in 2008-2009 ; 0 otherwise.
Cross-sectional bailout probability Pr(BDi) is modeled in the next way :
Pr(BDi) = α0 + βBCi,2007 + γSRi,2007 + χPLi,2006−2008 + ηRTi,2003−2006 + i
where BCi,2007 represent bank balance sheet characteristics for 2007 (indicators from pri-
vate bank and company default models) ; SRi,2007 are measures of bank systemic risk (and
contribution to systemic risk) in 2007 ; PLi,2007 are variables measuring political influence
and locational advantages of the bank ; RTi,2003−2006 include variables associated with bank
excessive individual risk-taking during the four years prior to crisis.
The detailed description of the variables and its selection is provided in section 3 and in
appendix.
OLS model includes the same predictive variables while dependent variable is continuous
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and represents the relative size of disbursed amounts.
2.2 Determinants of CPP refunds during 2009-2012
2.2.1 Multinomial (polytomous) logistic regression
This type of regression is used in order to define which factors influenced the probability
of bailout repayments by the U.S. banks. The discrete dependent variable in that model
represents the bank’s progress in CPP refund by July 31, 2012. The set of coefficients for
explanatory variables is estimated for each outcome : no bailout y = 0, bailout and total
repayment y = 1, bailout and partial repayment y = 2, bailout and no repayment y = 3 (see
details in appendix).
There is no data available separately on applications for the bailouts and approvals for
participation in CPP. The banks from the sample which did not receive CPP funds were, on
one hand, banks that were refused the funds due to insolvency and high risk of taxpayer-
funded credit non-repayment. On the other hand, these were the banks that did not require
that kind of aid or could attract alternative external financing. Banks that received the
bailout and repaid it totally during 2009-2012 should have been more financially stable than
those that did not repay the bailout, otherwise banks potentially abused the bailout program
in order to keep additional liquidity in their financial turnover and to generate extra income.
The model requires to set one outcome as a base one, thus, setting coefficients for that
outcome equal to zero. That is, when setting outcome ”bailout and total repayment” (y = 1)
as an arbitrary, the coefficients for remaining outcomes measure the change relative to that
base group.
2.2.2 Duration analysis
Under the Capital Purchase Program financial institutions have received the funds at
more or less the same period (mostly fourth quarter of 2008), while the date of repayment
has been defined by each bank individually. The time until the bailout repayment is another
7
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measure describing the realised risks of CPP funds allocation.
A central component of the analysis in this section is the hazard rate which is the pro-
bability of the CPP refunds at time ti, conditional on not having repaid the bailout before
(or having survived to time ti).
The semiparametric Cox proportional hazards model does not make assumptions about
the shape of h0(t). However, when a correct form of the h0(t) is chosen, the model could fit
the data better and could produce better results.
Parametric models can be based, on one hand, on the proportional hazards assumption,
on the other hand, on the accelerated failure time assumption.
To capture the monotonically increasing shape of the hazard function (the graph of
Kaplan-Meier estimate is available on demand), the Weibull distribution is chosen (see details
in appendix).
The flattening of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimate at the end of distribution, however,
suggests a possibility of non-monotonic pattern of duration dependence. The log-logistic
distribution is chosen among other AFT models.
The choice between the parametric models is made using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and log-likelihood. The AIC scores are compared between the parametric models. The
lowest value of AIC is found for the Weibull model of baseline hazard, even though the graph
of hazard function estimates (available on demand) suggests a greater resemblance with log-
logistic and log-normal models. Log-logistic distribution of hazard function is preferred to
log-normal one according to AIC criterion, besides it is commonly used when fitting data
with censoring.
Thus, three duration models are finally fitted : the Cox proportional hazards model (no
specific parametrization), the Weibull proportional hazards model (monotonically increasing
hazard function) and the log-logistic model (non-monotonic unimodal hazard).
8
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3 Data and summary statistics
3.1 Data description
To construct the sample of firms, U.S. domestically controlled commercial banks were
selected in DataStream. These financial firms operated on the U.S. market in U.S. dollars
and were still active on December, 2008. After selecting variables needed for estimation,
around 650 commercial banks were left in the sample.
The data on bailouts (promised amount, actually disbursed amount, the date of entering
the program) and bailout reimbursement (amount repaid, date of repayment) is obtained
from Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability. The data on political contributions and lobbying
expenditures of PACs 3 related to banks comes from the website of the Federal Election
Commission in the U.S.
The data from three sources is merged (see details in appendix). Bailouts under CPP were
provided to domestically controlled banks, bank holding companies, savings associations,
and savings and loans holding companies. 707 financial institutions finally received financing
under CPP. Commercial banks that appear on the bailout list received the bailout, while
others did not. Only actually disbursed amount is considered as a fact of the bank bailout.
After outliers selection procedure, 597 banks are left in the sample.
3.2 Dependent variables
3.2.1 CPP funds allocations in 2008-2009
• Bailout dummy
The variable BDi is a dummy that takes on two values, 0 and 1 (see table 1) to
distinguish between the banks that did not receive CPP funds and those who did.
Banks that have finally received CPP funds applied for Capital Purchase Program
3Political Active Committees
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(CPP), have been approved for funding and then accepted the funds. Out of 597 banks
in the sample approximately 320 banks did not receive a bailout, while around 280
received the CPP funds.
- INSERT TABLE 1 -
• Bailout continuous variable
Bailout continuous variable represents actually disbursed CPP funds amount norma-
lised by bank total assets. The maximum relative size of the bailout reaches 7% (see
table 1). Among the bailed out banks more than 50% obtained capital of the relative
size between 2% and 3% of their total assets. The correlation with dependent variables
is shown in table 2. Correlation coefficients are higher in its absolute values for the
bailout dummy but the most correlated explanatory variables remain the same for the
relative size of bailout.
- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE -
3.2.2 CPP refunds between 2009 and 2012
• Bailout repayments
This discrete dependent variable classifies the banks in four groups : banks that did
not receive the bailout at all (y = 0), banks that received the bailout and repaid it
totally (y = 1), repaid it partly (y = 2) or did not repay the bailout at all (y = 3).
Slightly more than half of represented banks did not receive the CPP funds during
2008-2009. Around 20% of the banks received the bailout and repaid it totally, another
20% of the banks never repaid it by 31 of July, 2012, while small fraction of the banks
(less than 5%) repaid it partly (majority of these banks repaid at least 50% of the total
amount).
• Time-to-repayment
10
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The time at risk or time until the event occurs (here the CPP funds repayment) is
analysed in duration models.
Only bailed out banks are considered for the analysis. Thus, around half of observations
are left in the sample, around 280 banks. The analysed period is limited between the
distribution of the CPP funds in 2008 and July 31, 2012. In this period approximately
half of these banks repaid the bailouts while others did not.
CPP refund is only taken into account if the bank managed to repurchase the total
amount of preferred shares from the Treasury by the end of the analysed period (total
refund). Time to repayment is counted in days.
The data and the repayment announcements suggest the first repayments to take place
in March of 2009, around half a year after the start of CPP program. For the rest the
probability of CPP refunds increases with time (see 2.2.2 for details).
3.3 Bank balance sheet characteristics
Bank balance sheet characteristics are financial statement variables that define the ”fi-
nancial health” of the bank, or, in other words, determine the probability of the bank’s
default (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012 ; Ratnovski and Huang, 2009). Here indicators from the
next three models are included : Altman’s Z-score, KMV Moody’s RiskCalc for U.S. banks,
BondScore (Credit Sights) model. Some indicators appear to be highly correlated with each
other and need to be excluded from the final estimation.
3.3.1 Altman’s Z-score
Z-score bankruptcy model proposes Z-score indicator for each firm as a discriminant score
that represents level of distress of that firm. Five financial ratios constitute the score with
defined weights for each of them (see details in appendix). Higher Z-score is interpreted as
an indicator of a ”safer” or, in other words, more financially healthy firm, while low Z-score
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indicates higher level of distress of the firm.
It is expected that safer financial firms before the crisis should experience less need in
bailout funds during the crisis and, thus, probability of the bailout for such banks should be
lower.
3.3.2 Moody’s KMV RiskCalc V3.1 U.S. Banks
More recent Moody’s KMV RiskCalc V3.1 is the Moody’s rating agency model for pre-
dicting probability of the bank default. It comprises financial statement variables and equity
market information on the bank’s prospects and business risk.
As expected default frequency measures as well as the formula for computing them are not
available in public access, the input variables of Moody’s model are plugged directly in the
regressions (taking into account multicollinearity issues with indicators from other models).
Each category is represented by at least one variable, descriptive statistics is provided in
table 1. Some variables are discussed below.
Asset Concentration group consists of two variables : relative size of real estate
mortgage loans (AC1 in tables) and commercial and industrial loans (AC2 in tables)
in the bank’s portfolio.
Real Estate Mortgage Loans (AC1) include commercial and construction mortgages, thus,
its relative size could be positively correlated with the size of commercial and industrial loans
(AC2). It appears though that two normalised sizes of these groups of loans are highly but
negatively correlated with each other (correlation coefficient is -0.89, table 2). It means that
if bank loan portfolio is concentrated in real estate mortgage loans, the bank loans less for
commercial and industrial purposes4. That gives an impression of a bank ”specialisation”.
Liquidity-related variables (Liquidity group) should measure the share of liquid assets
on the balance sheet of the bank. Moody’s RiskCalc v3.1 U.S. Banks model (2006) and Basel
II regulation classified mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as safe and liquid holdings. That
4Commercial and industrial loans represent a general amount of loans made to business and industry
excluding commercial mortgages and including consumer loans
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was indeed the case at the time, MBSs also included government mortgages provided by
Government National Mortgage Association or other U.S. agencies.
In the recent crisis MBSs became highly risky and illiquid assets. That is why the initial
indicator proposed in Moody’s RiskCalc model that brings together Treasury securities and
mortgage-backed securities (as both representing liquid groups of assets) is replaced by two
separate ratios.
Asset Quality group is represented by the share of non-performing loans in total
loans. Lower asset quality is expected to increase the probability of default and, conse-
quently, the probability of the bailout. Nevertheless, the correlation coefficient between bai-
lout dependent variables and normalised non-performing loans in 2007 is negative (-0.11 and
-0.12 with bailout dummy and relative size of disbursed amount, table 2).
3.3.3 BondScore Model
BondScore Credit Model is another model that calculates credit risks for all U.S. non-
financial corporations with total assets in excess of $250 millions and publicly traded equity.
Three variable from BondScore Model are analysed (others are similar or even same as
variables from Moody’s RiskCalc Model) : ratio of EBITDA to bank’s net sales (EBITDA
margin, EM), leverage (Lev) and volatility of EBITDA (V ol). It is expected that commercial
banks with higher margin, smaller leverage and smaller volatility exhibit a smaller probability
of default and, consequently, less shortage in liquidity during the crisis.
However, first two BondScore variables cannot be kept in regressions due to the high risk
of multicollinearity.
3.4 Systemic Risk variables
The bailout packages were designed in large part to limit systemic risk in the financial
system - that is, risk of a spillover effect of a crisis from one big institution to another and
from the financial sector to the economy at large.
13
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One of the most frequently used proxies of systemic risk is a firm’s size (standardised,
Size, table 3). It supports ”too big to fail” argument : the lender of last resort cannot deny
support to large financial institutions whose closure would significantly affect the rest of the
market (Freixas and Parigi, 2008). Correlation coefficients are presented in table 4. Bank’s
size is indeed highly and positively correlated with bailout dependent variables.
- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE -
The second variable that represents the systemic risk is Beta. It is the correlation between
stock returns of financial institution and the overall market. In the period of crisis market in
general performed very badly, thus, firms with higher beta should exhibit a higher probability
of default and thus, require government intervention.
- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE -
∆CoV aR was developed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009). ∆CoV aR represents the
difference between the Value-at-Risk of financial sector conditional on the institution ”i”
being under distress and Value-at-Risk in regular times (see details in appendix).
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MESα) is expected percentage loss in market value
faced by one institution given that a shock drives the market beyond the threshold C (market
drop by more than a certain threshold, see details in appendix).
MES is calculated over three different periods (it could not be done with ∆CoV aR as
there are not enough observations) : for the year 2007, for the period of 8 years preceding
the crisis (from 2000 to 2007) and for the periods of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers
collapses (February and March of 2008 ; September and October of 2008).
All the measures of systemic risk are calculated in a way that the higher value of the va-
riable indicates higher contribution of the commercial bank to the systemic risk. Correlation
coefficients from table 4 are positive confirming that higher contribution to systemic risk is
associated with the higher probability of the bailout and larger relative size of the disbursed
amount.
14
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3.5 Political Involvement and Location related variables
The financial sector is one of the largest contributors to federal political campaigns.
Political contributions are not done directly by the financial firms but through especially
organised political action committees (PACs). The data on PACs contributions only contains
information on official contribution of the bank-related PACs so only 3.3% of the financial
firms are found to be contributors between 2006 and 2008.
Lobbying expenditures is another form of political support of government agencies. The
political involvement dummy is then constructed which takes on value of 1 if in the under-
lined period the PAC related to the particular bank made a political campaign or lobbying
contribution, 0 otherwise. Correlation of political involvement dummy with dependent va-
riables suggests positive influence of the former on the latter one (0.12, 0.08 and 0.08 with
bailout dummy, relative size of disbursed amount and repayment categorical variable).
The distribution of bank assets across the states is not the same. Even when the size of
bank assets in two states is similar, the distribution of bank assets across organisation size
is never identical (Berger et al., 1995) in these two states. Thus, the state dummy is then
included into regression.
3.6 Excessive bank’s risk-taking related variables
Several attempts to use the past history of financial institution were made in the literature
to see if banks with riskier strategies learned in past crises or continued following original
business concepts5.
The representative variable from this group aims to account for individual risk-taking of
the bank.
Change in stock prices is calculated as a difference of log stock prices between 2003 and
2006. Firms that take on more risk and follow riskier strategies with higher returns are
5For instance, through the performance of the banks during LTCM crisis in 1998, Fahlenbrach et al
(2011)
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expected to experience an important increase in their stock prices in that period (due to
the development of securitization and other financial instruments). These should also be the
firms that are hit the most during the crisis and that require government intervention to
remain active on the market.
It is logical that several financial ratios proposed by different probability of default models
are similar to each other. Including all of them could be a reason of high multicollinearity in
the regressions that would lead to greater standard errors and larger estimated coefficients.
The correlation matrix for all financial indicators is shown in table 2.
4 Results
4.1 Results for Logit and OLS regressions analysing the bank bai-
lout probability and the relative size of disbursed amount un-
der CPP during 2008-2009 in the U.S.
The results are reported in table 5. Columns 3, 5 and 7 present results for logit regressions
with binary outcome : bailout or no bailout. Columns 4, 6 and 8 present results for OLS
cross-sectional regressions where the dependent variable is the actually disbursed amount
normalised by bank’s total assets. For each model, the results for three alternative regressions
are reported with different measures of systemic risk : beta (Betai,2007), columns 3 and 4 ;
bank size (Sizei,2007), columns 5 and 6 and Marginal Expected Shortfall over 7 years from
2000 to 2007 (MESi,2000−2007), columns 7 and 8.
In order to avoid large tables and concentrate on significant variables, regressions are
conducted using stepwise backward selection method with significance level for removal of
0.05. Balance sheet variables, systemic risk and individual excessive risk-taking variables
are standardized. It makes the size of parameters (or effects of the explanatory variables)
comparable within each column.
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The empirical evidence is in favor of the main argument provided in the beginning of
this article : the bailouts have been provided to the more financially distressed firms (illiquid
commercial banks). Banks with higher Z-score in 2007 (thus, ”safer” or more financially
stable banks according to Altman’s Z-score) exhibit a smaller probability of bailout in 2008-
2009 (see columns 3, 5 and 7, table 5) and if bailed out, they receive CPP funds of a smaller
size (see columns 4, 6 and 8, table 5).
- INSERT TABLE 5 HERE -
Besides, OLS regression with beta (column 4, table 5) suggests that an increase in Z-score
by one (variable is standardised, thus its standard deviation is equal to one) is associated
with reduction in the relative bailout size by 0.3%.
Among Moody’s RiskCalc model indicators these are asset concentration, liquidity and
asset quality variables that are significant and that remain robust in each regression.
The empirical results suggest that the banks more specialised in commercial and indus-
trial loans (AC2 in tables) than in mortgage lending (AC1 in tables) were more likely to be
bailed out (and to receive larger amounts of financial aid) in 2008-2009.
On one hand, the crisis of 2007 was originated in the subprime loan market and one could
expect regulators to start saving banks with higher share of mortgage loans. On the other
hand, under both Basel I and Basel II the weight of mortgage loans in risk-weighted assets
was smaller than that of corporate loans. Thus, banks exposed to corporate loans could be
considered as more affected during the crisis.
In many cases banks that have originated large amounts of mortgage loans securitised
them, repacked and then sold to third-party investors in form of mortgage-backed securities.
These assets (including AAA-rated mortgage-backed tranches) became illiquid following the
collapse in housing markets. The one could expect monetary regulators to focus on saving
the banks with higher exposure to mortgage-backed securities in order to raise the liquidity
in financial market. Results show that it was not the case : firms with higher exposure to
mortgage-backed securities (Liq2 in tables) were less likely to be bailed out (and if bailed
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out, received a smaller amount).
Treasury securities remained one of the most liquid and, thus, high demanded financial
assets during the financial crisis. Hence, more liquid banks in terms of higher share of treasury
securities (Liq1 in tables) on their balance sheets should have been financially more stable
during the crisis and should not have applied for the financial funds (or applied for a relatively
smaller amount). The estimated coefficients from table 5 confirm that argument.
Part of originated before the financial crisis loans remained on the banks’ balance sheets.
It could be argued that banks preferred to leave on their balance sheets high quality loans
while subprime loans have been mostly securitised and sold to other entities (Acharya et al.,
2010). That problem is otherwise referred to as an ”adverse selection” problem of lenders.
However, subprime and lower quality loans have had much higher yield than any other
type of loans and could be left on the banks’ balance sheets (as well ABCP, CDOs and CLOs).
Furthermore, due to the abrupt rise in the interest rates even prime borrowers experienced
difficulties with repayment of their debt. Results suggest that banks with higher share of
non-performing loans in 2007 (AQ in tables), however, had a smaller probability to receive
CPP funds and if received, their size was smaller.
Systemic risk variables beta (Betai,2007), bank size (Sizei,2007) and MES (MESi,2000−2007)
have positive significant coefficients which means that regulators concentrated in offering
liquidity to larger, more correlated with the market and riskier institutions. Another measure
of systemic risk, CoV aRi,2000−2007 is not significant which can be due to not long enough
period of estimation and low frequency of used data (no other data is available in free
access).
Political involvement variable appears positively significant only in one regression which
also can be due to the poor data available in the free access.
State dummy is not significant at all, as well as bank’s individual risk-taking measured
by the past performance of the bank’s stock prices.
Models fit the data well, R-squared (pseudo R-squared for logit) reaches 17%-18%.
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4.2 Polytomous and time-to-repayment regressions analysing the
bank repayments of CPP funds during 2009-2012 in the U.S.
4.2.1 Polytomous logistic model
This multinomial model is used to define the factors that determine the probability of
bailout repayment/non-repayment under the CPP during 2009-2012. Dependent variable
describes if the bank was bailed out or not, and if it was, which share of the bailout did
the bank repay : total amount, a part of the disbursed amount or nothing at all (see section
3.2.2 for details).
Results for multinomial regressions are presented in terms of signs of the estimated co-
efficients in table 6. The full results with exact values of the coefficients are available on
demand. The base outcome is a positive decision concerning the bank bailout under CPP
and its total repayment by commercial bank during 2009-2012.
- INSERT TABLE 6 HERE -
The third column of table 6 reports results for the group of banks that did not receive
CPP funds (”No bailout”). The signs of the multinomial estimates show the change (positive
or negative) in logit of outcome ”no bailout” (group ”0”) relative to the group of banks that
received CPP funds and repaid them totally (group ”1”) given the other variables in the
model are held constant.
These results confirm those for logit and OLS regressions from the previous section. Safer
banks or more financially stable banks (with higher Altman’s Z-score in 2007) are less likely
to receive CPP funds during the crisis. Positive sign in table 6 indicates that increase in
bank’s Altman’s score (Z) in 2007 is associated with higher probability of a bank not to be
bailed out by the government in 2008-2009.
Commercial banks with higher shares of real estate mortgage loans (AC1) and non-
performing loans (AQ) are more likely to receive no CPP funds as it is suggested by the
signs of coefficients from the third column ”No bailout”. Besides, even if banks with higher
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share of that sort of loans received the bailout, they exhibit a higher probability not to repay
it (table 6, column 5 ”Bailout and no repayment”). An opposite effect is found for the banks
that are more exposed to commercial and industrial loans (AC2) : they are more likely to be
bailed out and less likely not to repay it during 2009-2012.
These results should be thought of in two ways, from the point of view of minimising the
risks for taxpayers and from the point of view of restoring the financial stability. From the
point of view of taxpayer, the risks have been minimised. The CPP funds were provided to
the banks with the highest probability of repaying them in short term : banks with smaller
exposure to mortgage and non-performing loans and higher exposure to commercial loans.
However, from the point of view of consumers and borrowers, the program had a po-
tentially ineffective side. Commercial banks with higher exposure to mortgage loans and
non-performing loans did not get enough external financing from the government in the per-
iod of the crisis. Banks more specialised in real estate mortgage loans were the ones affected
the most by the crisis and without appropriate help from the government potentially failed
to restructure a large part of mortgage loans and continued to perform poorly due to a
large amount of foreclosures. Facing liquidity problems such banks needed to raise mortgage
interest rates putting even creditworthiness homeowners in difficult financial position.
Banks with stronger positions in treasury securities (Liq1) and MBSs (Liq2) before the
crisis are less likely to be bailed out in 2008-2009. The first relationship is justified by high
safety and liquidity of Treasury bills, especially in the time of crisis (”flight to security”
argument). The second relationship is less clear as MBSs became highly illiquid during the
crisis. There are two potential explanations : first, banks kept on their balance sheets MBSs
of a good quality6 (”adverse selection” argument), second, government help was provided
to the banks that have had higher chances to repay it, thus, to those banks that were less
exposed to MBSs.
If the results for ”No bailout” outcome (column 3) are compared with the results for
6Agency-backed MBSs of the prime loan type.
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”Bailout and no repayment” (column 5) outcome, it can be noticed that liquidity indicators
described above as well as Z-score are not significant in predicting the repayment/non-
repayment of CPP funds by the commercial banks. It means that, first of all, that more
financially stable and liquid firms prior to crisis applied less for CPP funds (and potentially
were rarely approved for participation in the program). Secondly, if they applied, their level
of safety and liquidity before the crisis did not affect the probability of the CPP funds
repayment. Besides, higher exposure to MBSs is not associated with later or earlier CPP
funds repayment.
All systemic risk variables are significant with negative coefficients when predicting the
”No bailout” (column 3) and ”Bailout and no repayment” (column 5) outcomes. The signs
of the estimates tell us that larger banks with higher potential contribution to systemic risk
(higher beta Betsi,2007 and MES MESi,2000−2007) were less likely not to receive CPP funds.
That confirms that CPP was designed to bail out systemically important and ”too big to
fail” financial institutions.
Besides, a large part of banks with higher contribution to systemic risk repaid the bailout
totally during 2008-2009 (or had a lower probability of CPP funds non-repayment). It allows
to conclude that the focus of CPP on bailing out systematically important institutions was
effective from both sides. From the point of view of taxpayer these banks were the ones that
repurchased their shares in the shortest notice. From the point of view of borrowers and
restoring of financial stability the failure of large institutions was avoided which could have
led to the large externality costs for the other sectors of economy.
Thus, more systematically important, large and interconnceted financial institutions
could be finally characterised as ”temporarily illiquid but healthy” during the crisis. Ne-
vertheless, it shoud not be forgotten that larger banks have greater capacities of restoring
their activities that are represented in diverse forms and of attracting alternative sources of
financing partly due to their ”too big to fail” position.
It is at some point logical that these institutions could repurchase their shares form
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the Treasury fast enough and it does not confirm the soundness of ”too big to fail”. The
big collapse of these institutions was avoided, however, more reforms should be introduced
(expanding the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, see
Acharya et al., 2011 for the discussion) in order to limit the propensity of the financial sector
to put the entire system at risk and to benefit from its too-big-to-fail position.
It can be concluded then that in terms of efficiency for taxpayers the CPP funds have
been disbursed in the correct way, in order to limit the probability of CPP funds non-
repayments. Besides, the collapse of large financial institutions has been avoided that could
have been translated into the collapse the entire banking sector. However, banks which could
if properly motivated help to avoid the bankruptcy of the large number of homeowners and
other borrowers have not been supported.
4.2.2 Time to repayment analysis
This section presents the results for duration analysis where dependent variable is the time
until CPP funds repayment. The choice of parametrizations for that analysis is described in
section 2.2.2. Each continuous variable that enters the model is checked for correlation with
the dependent variable. Besides, the models with single continuous predictors are considered
as well as the results of the Chi-squared tests in order to choose predictors for the final
model.
Results for three types of regressions (with Cox PH, Weibull and log-logistic parametri-
zations) are presented in table 7. Besides, the signs of estimated coefficients for log-logistic
AFT are also included in table 6 to compare with previous results.
The interpretation of coefficients is different for proportional hazards models (Cox PH and
Weibull PH, columns 3, 4, 5 and 6, table 7) and accelerated failure time models (log-logistic
AFT, columns 7 and 8, same table). The coefficients from the first pair of models indicate
how coviariates affect the hazard rate. Positive coefficients increase the hazard rate and,
therefore, reduce the expected duration. The positive coefficients from AFT models indicate
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how covariates affect the logged survival time and, hence, increase expected duration.
The first view on the signs of the regression coefficients confirms that results of all three
models are coherent. The impacts of covariates are similar in terms of the signs of coefficients,
and their level of significance does not change from one model to another.
The results are in line with those presented in the previous sections (columns 5 and
6, table 6). More systemically risky banks managed to repurchase their preferred shares
faster than the rest, while those with higher cash flows per share, higher concentration of
non-performing and mortgage loans had more difficulties with repaying the bailouts. It can
be also the case that banks with higher cash flow per share did not wish to repurchase
their shares from the Treasury too fast (as this predictor also has a positive impact on the
probability of partial repayment, column 4, table 6) as it was a comfortable and relatively
cheap source of external financing comparing to the market conditions.
The goodness of fit is checked by using, first of all, plots of estimated hazard functions and,
secondly, Cox-Snell residuals. The plot of the Nelson-Aalen cumulative hazard function for
Cox-Snell residuals for the log-logistic function has the poorest fit with respect to the 45◦ line
with the slope of 1. The plots for the models with Weibull and log-logistic parametrizations
seem to be the both close to linearity (graphs are available on demand).
5 Conclusion
In the aftermath of the crisis one of the questions that is still discussed by the policy-
makers and academics is the effectiveness of the government and Central Bank responses to
the financial crisis.
Various econometric techniques are used in this article to study the factors that determi-
ned the CPP funds disbursement and their repayment in the period between 2009 and July,
2012. The results from each section are coherent and complement each other.
Bailout packages provided under CPP seem to be efficient in responding to liquidity
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crisis subject to the large banks that contributed the most to systemic risk. Due to that,
the propagation of the financial crisis was slowed down even though there is many criticism
concerning the late response (announcement of loan guarantees and recapitalisations) of the
Federal Reserve.
However, it is logical that these institutions could repurchase their shares from the Trea-
sury fast enough and it does not confirm the soundness of ”too big to fail”. The big collapse
of these institutions was avoided, however, more reforms have to be introduced (expanding
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010) in order to limit
the propensity of the financial sector to put the entire system at risk and to benefit from its
too-big-to-fail position.
The allocation of CPP funds was also effective from the point view of taxpayer. Larger
firms with smaller shares of mortgage and non-performing loans, higher shares of commercial
loans and greater contributions to systemic risk were the ones with the highest probability
to receive the CPP funds and to receive larger amounts but also to reimburse them totally
in shorter notice.
Thus, larger and more systemically important banks were mostly considered viable and
were recapitalised, while other banks that were actually exposed to the mortgage market
were denied financial aid (some of them went bankrupt). In this sense, CPP potentially
did not succeed in supporting cosumers’ loan recapitalisations and restructurings that could
become a reason of large welfare loses for the homeowners.
Designing the programs addressing the housing crisis through minimisation of mortgage
default losses could incite faster recovery of financial markets and economy as a whole.
Supporting mortgage-specialised banks could reduce the number of delinquent borrowers,
foreclosures and other externalities.
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Appendices
A Construction of variables
A.1 Altman’s Z-score
Altman’s Bankruptcy model suggests an index based on the five main financial ratios
where weight of each variables defined using discriminant analysis :
Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + 0.999X5
where X1 is the ratio of difference between current assets and current liabilities to total
assets ; X2 is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets ; X3 is the ratio of earnings before
interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets ; X4 is the ratio of market value of equity to total
liabilities ; X5 is the ratio of sales to total assets.
A.2 Systemic Risk related indicators
Bank size (Sizei,2007) is calculated as the logarithm of total assets of the bank.
Beta (Betai,2007) is taken from Datastream and represents the measure of the asset’s risk
with relation to the market (correlation with the market) over the past 5 years. Thus, beta
for 2007 is actually calculated for the period from 2002 to 2007.
∆CoV aRp is a systemic risk indicator that measures the marginal contribution of a
separate financial firm to the risk of the whole financial sector. As the name of the variable
shows it, the prefix ”co” stands for conditional, contagion and comovement (Adrian and
Brunnermeier, 2011). This measure of COntribution of the institution i to the systemic risk
of the financial system is measured as the difference between Value-at-Risk of the financial
sector conditional on institution i being in distress (V aR
FS|”i”distress
p ) and the Value-at-Risk
of the financial sector in normal times (V aRFSp ) :
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∆CoV aRip = V aR
FS|”i”distress
p − V aRFSp
Institution ”i” is said to be in distress when it exhibits the lowest growth rates of its
market-valued total financial assets defined through the pth percentile (here 5th percentile,
thus, bottom 5% of the returns). V aRFSp is the mean of growth rates of the financial sector
in the 5th percentile of its distribution unconditionally on the state of separate institutions.
The growth rate of market valued total assets (X it) is calculated in the next way :
X it =
MEit · LEV it −MEit−1 · LEV it−1
MEit−1 · LEV it−1
=
Ait − Ait−1
Ait−1
Knowing that
Ait = ME
i
t · LEV it = BAit · (
MEit
BEit
)
where MEit is the market value of an intermediary i ’s total equity, LEV
i
t is the ratio of total
assets to book equity, Ait are market-valued total assets, BA
i
t are book-valued total assets,
MEit
BEit
is market-to-book ratio of the institution ”i”.
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) the growth rate of the whole financial sector
is calculated as the average market-valued returns of all financial institutions, weighted by
the lagged market value of their assets :
XFSt =
∑
i
(X it · wit−1)
where wit−1 is the weight of the financial institution i in the financial sector at the period
t-1. The (unconditional) Value-at-Risk of the financial sector is then defined as the bottom
5% of the growth rate of the financial sector between 1990 and July, 2008 (quarterly data
from Compustat). The Value-at-Risk of the financial system conditional on institution i
being in distress is calculated as the mean of growth rates of financial sector in the periods
when institution i was found to be in distress. The difference between the two measures is
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∆CoV aRip, the contribution of the institution i to the risks of financial sector in general.
Marginal Expected Shortfall (MESα) is expected percentage loss in market value
faced by one institution given that a shock drives the market beyond the threshold C (market
drop by more than a certain threshold). Expected shortfall is the average of financial market
returns on days when the portfolio’s loss exceeds its VaR limit. The financial market return
R is the sum of each bank’s return ri :
R =
∑
i
wi · ri
where wi is the weight of bank ”i” in the overall banking system. The expected shortfall of
the financial market can be then represented as a weighted sum of individual banks’ expected
shortfall :
ESα = −
∑
i
wiE[ri |R ≤ −V aRα]
The derivative of the financial system expected shortfall with respect to the weight of bank
yi is then bank ”i”’s expected shortfall :
∂ESα
∂wi
= −E[ri
∣∣R ≤ −V aRα] = MESiα
Here MESiα is calculated with 100% − α = 95% confidence. Thus, MESi5% is computed in
the next way :
MESi5% =
1
N
∑
t:R−in−its−5%−tail
rit (1)
where 1
N
∑
t:R−in−its−5%−tail r
i
t is the average of returns of financial firm i in the 5% worst-case
periods of aggregate stock market losses (measured on a daily basis through S&P 500 index).
MESi5% is calculated for the year 2007, 2006 and over 8 years between 2000 and 2007.
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Table 1: Summary of dependent variables and balance sheet characteristics from Altman’s
and Moody’s models for U.S. commercial banks
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bailout dummy BDi 644 0.44 0.5 0 1
Size of the bailout normalised by
bank total assets
Bi 644 0.01 0.01 0 0.07
Bailout and repayment categorical
variable
Ri 644 0.87 1.16 0 3
Z-score,
standardized
Z 597 0 1.00 -2.92 4.27
Moody’s RiskCalc U.S. Banks
Total equity to total assets,
winsorized at 2% level, standardized
CS1 661 0 1 -1.20 3.54
Total deposits to total assets,
winsorized at 1% level, standardized
CS2 642 0 1 -1.67 2.80
Net revenues to total assets,
winsorized at 1% level, standardized
P1 654 0 1 -2.25 3.68
Cash flow per share,
winsorized at 2% level, standardized
P2 640 0 1 -0.84 3.50
Mortgage Real Estate Loans to to-
tal loans ratio (in percentage),
standardized
AC1 661 0 1 -3.56 2.02
Consumer and Industrial Loans to
total loans ratio (in percentage),
winsorized at 2% level, standardized
AC2 653 0 1 -1.22 3.21
Treasury Securities to total assets
ratio (in percentage),
winsorized at 2% level, standardized
Liq1 607 0 1 -0.56 3.59
Mortgage-Backed Securities to to-
tal assets ratio (in percentage),
winsorized at 2% level, standardized
Liq2 641 0 1 -1.04 3.36
Non-performing loans to total
loans ratio (in percentage),
winsorized at 2% level, standardized
AQ 661 0 1 -.91 3.69
28
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.72
T
a
b
l
e
2:
C
or
re
la
ti
on
b
et
w
ee
n
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
(d
u
m
m
y
an
d
re
la
ti
ve
si
ze
of
b
ai
lo
u
t)
an
d
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
b
al
an
ce
sh
ee
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
fo
r
U
S
b
an
k
s
M
o
d
e
l
V
a
r
B
D
B
R
Z
C
S
1
C
S
2
P
1
P
2
A
C
1
A
C
2
L
iq
1
L
iq
2
A
Q
E
M
L
e
v
V
o
l
B
a
il
-t
d
u
m
m
y
B
D
1.
00
B
a
il
-t
s
iz
e
B
0.
90
1.
00
R
e
p
a
y
-
t
R
0.
82
0.
78
1.
00
A
lt
m
a
n
’s
Z
-
s
c
o
r
e
Z
-0
.2
0
-0
.1
6
-0
.2
2
1.
00
M
o
o
d
y
’s
C
S
1
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
2
-0
.1
5
0
.6
6
1.
00
R
is
k
C
a
lc
C
S
2
0.
11
0.
07
0.
06
-0
.0
6
-0
.1
9
1.
00
P
1
-0
.0
5
0.
00
-0
.0
3
0.
24
-0
.0
7
-0
.0
8
1.
00
P
2
0.
04
0.
01
0.
04
0.
11
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
0.
15
1.
00
A
C
1
-0
.1
6
-0
.1
5
-0
.0
5
0.
01
0.
06
0.
10
-0
.1
9
-0
.0
8
1.
00
A
C
2
0.
15
0.
16
0.
06
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
6
-0
.1
2
0.
20
0.
08
-0
.8
9
1.
00
L
iq
1
-0
.1
7
-0
.1
9
-0
.1
4
0.
00
0.
07
-0
.0
8
-0
.1
5
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
3
1
.0
0
L
iq
2
-0
.1
0
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
5
0.
03
0.
00
0.
26
-0
.3
1
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
1
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
2
1
.0
0
A
Q
-0
.1
1
-0
.1
2
0.
03
-0
.2
4
-0
.0
8
0.
04
0.
15
0.
13
0.
07
-0
.0
3
0
.0
3
-0
.1
1
1
.0
0
B
o
n
d
E
M
0.
05
0.
02
-0
.0
5
0
.5
6
0.
12
0.
29
0.
02
-0
.0
2
0.
03
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
3
0
.1
1
-0
.4
3
1
.0
0
L
e
v
0.
15
0.
14
0.
20
-0
.7
7
-0
.4
4
0.
14
-0
.2
2
-0
.1
1
0.
07
-0
.0
8
0
.0
2
-0
.0
3
0
.1
9
-0
.3
7
1
.0
0
V
o
l
0.
02
0.
04
0.
07
-0
.1
5
-0
.1
2
0.
12
0.
22
-0
.0
2
0.
10
-0
.0
1
-0
.1
1
-0
.0
6
0
.1
8
-0
.1
4
0
.0
2
1
.0
0
29
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.72
Table 3: Summary of BondScore balance sheet characteristics, systemic risk, political in-
volvement and individual risk-taking related variables
Variable Name Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
BondScore U.S.
EBITDA2007
Sales2007
,
winsorized at 2%level, standardized
EM 632 0 1 -3.24 1.83
Debt2007
MarketCap+BookV alueDebt2007
,
winsorized at 1%level, standardized
Lev 604 0 1 -3.57 2.52
V olatility2007,
standardized
V ol 502 0 1 -1.88 3.43
Systemic risk
Size (logarithm of total as-
sets),
standardized
Sizei,2007 661 0 1 -2.84 3.49
Beta,
standardized
Betai,2007 621 0 1 -1.76 2.78
Marginal expected shortfall
(MES) for 2007,
standardized
MESi,2007 626 0 1 -2.41 2.95
Marginal expected shortfall
(MES) over 8 years between
2000 and 2007,
winsorized at 1%level, standardized
MESi,2000−2007 632 0 1 -1.87 3.65
Marginal expected shortfall
(MES) for the Bear Stearns
and Lehman Brothers near-
collapse,
winsorized at 1%level, standardized
MESi,BSLB 608 0 1 -1.81 2.51
Conditional Value-at-Risk,
standardized
∆CoV aRi,1990−2007 628 0 1 -3.13 1.97
Political influence and lo-
cation
Political influence dummy PD2006−2008 658 0.03 0.18 0 1
State State 661 25.90 14.39 1 51
Individual risk-taking
Change in log stock prices du-
ring 2003-2006,
winsorized at 1% level, standardized
ln(qi,2003−2006) 525 0 1 -3.09 2.64
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Table 6: The influence of the main factors determining the CPP funds disbursement and
repayment, U.S. commercial banks, from polytomous logistic regression and survival analysis.
Base outcome for polytomous regression : bailout and total repayment
Polytomous regression Survival
analysis
Variable Name No bailout Bailout
and partial
repayment
Bailout
and no
repayment
Time to
repayment
(AFT)
Balance sheet
charac-s
Altman’s Z-score Z + −
Cash flow per share P2 + +
Mortgage loans
normalised by total
loans
AC1 + + +
Commercial and
industrial loans
normalised by total
loans
AC2 − − −
Treasury securuties
normalised by total
assets
Liq1 +
MBS normalised by
total assets
Liq1 +
Non-performing
loans normalised
by total loans
AQ + + + +
Systemic risk va-
riables
Beta Betai,2007 − − −
Size Sizei,2007 − − −
MES MESi,2000−2007 − − −
Pseudo R2 0.156 0.168 0.153
Obs 505 514 519 279
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